This is a good overview of what's going on as we are poising to invade Iraq. However, at one point it offended me. It was when the author praised the early success of the war in Afghanistan, measured in so few American causalities, with no regard for the suffering and devastation it inflicted on thousands of Afghans. And then his glee over people "dancing in the streets," when the new regime hardly was worth cheering about, bothered me, too. He says:

"That first phase was triumphant. The anxiety of last fall that somehow America and its allies would be stymied in Afghanistan, as the Soviets were two decades earlier, now seems silly. Routing al Qaeda and its protector, the Taliban regime in Kabul, proved remarkably easy. Watching joyful Afghans dancing in the streets was a joyful experience. The first phase has cost more than $30 billion and 51 American lives, but the initial mission was accomplished: no more Taliban, no more safe haven for al Qaeda."

But then he went on to document how we have cut ourselves off from the rest of the world in a withdrawal into unilateralism, leading to how misguided we are in what he thinks is a done deal to invade Iraq. "What is the purpose of poking an American finger in the eye of just about every country in the world? What does the administration hope to gain by emphasizing unilateral options, from declaring war without Congress to telling other nations to sign up or get out of the way? Does such bullying ever pay off in politics, domestic or international?"

-Suzanne-

September 8, 2002

The Long and Short of It:

The War on Terrorism Began So Well. Then the Focus Changed. What Is the Bush Administration Aiming to Do Now?

Robert G. Kaiser

Amid the hoopla surrounding the anniversary of Sept. 11, three questions seem apt: Why did the Bush administration veer off the course it set for itself a year ago, when President Bush promised to "rally the world" to fight a war against terrorism and then did so magnificently -- but only for a while?

Why has the administration now chosen to neglect its friends as it pursues its enemies -- or rather, the enemy most easily targeted, Saddam Hussein?

Why is the United States flirting with a new doctrine of preemptive war so radical it has no precedent in international law or American history -- and why hasn't this flirtation provoked our politicians to conduct a serious national debate, first of all in Congress?

We're still too close to these events to see them all clearly, but it's not too soon to see that the Bush administration's initial sure-footedness has given way to a stumbling clumsiness. This has been a bad summer for American diplomacy. It isn't easy for the world's leading power to alarm all of its allies in a matter of months, but this is what the United States has done, for purposes that remain mysterious.

The administration has accomplished this despite the successful beginning to the military campaign set off by the attacks on New York and Washington a year ago. Not only did President Bush rally allies on every continent to join an elaborate, efficient international coalition, but the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, used Sept. 11 to finally abandon the pretense that Russia and America could revive their Cold War rivalry. He allied his country firmly with the United States, then with the NATO alliance. Two Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, former parts of the Soviet Union, welcomed U.S. bases on their territory, creating a new geopolitical reality. No government on Earth openly took the side of al Qaeda.

That first phase was triumphant. The anxiety of last fall that somehow America and its allies would be stymied in Afghanistan, as the Soviets were two decades earlier, now seems silly. Routing al Qaeda and its protector, the Taliban regime in Kabul, proved remarkably easy. Watching joyful Afghans dancing in the streets was a joyful experience.

The first phase has cost more than $30 billion and 51 American lives, but the initial mission was accomplished: no more Taliban, no more safe haven for al Qaeda. But the campaign stalled in early December, when American commanders decided not to send U.S. troops into the mountains around Tora Bora, and Osama bin Laden escaped -- at least that was the conclusion of American intelligence.

Since then the war hasn't gone very well. Key al Qaeda leaders remain at large, presumably including bin Laden, though he may be dead. With or without him, our enemy can still operate. A new U.N. study concludes that "al Qaeda is by all accounts 'fit and well' and poised to strike again at its leisure." It is sobering to consider how much we still don't know about al Qaeda. German investigators have apparently established that the Sept. 11 plot was hatched in Hamburg in a cell led by Mohammed Atta, pilot of one of the planes that hit the World Trade Center. Who was Atta's superior? Unknown. Who in al Qaeda's hierarchy helped plan the attack, or approved it? Unknown. What was bin Laden's personal role? Unknown. What did the plot's authors hope would be its result -- what are their strategic goals, if any? Unknown, though bin Laden's past comments suggest some answers, such as pushing the United States out of Saudi Arabia.

"Know your enemy," soldiers like to say, but we've still got a lot to learn about al Qaeda.

The U.S. government has repeatedly advertised its own inability to penetrate or understand al Qaeda by issuing any number of brightly colored alerts and warnings that a new attack was imminent. Those wrong predictions suggest grave deficiencies in American intelligence, a subject our public figures have generally avoided.

Multilateralism was critical to the administration's early successes in the war on terrorism, which makes it all the more surprising that the Bush administration abandoned it so quickly. Beginning with the December decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a succession of policy choices revived the administration's reputation for unilateralism and infuriated old allies. Why did this happen?

The answer begins with the White House itself. If we know remarkably little about al Qaeda, we should also acknowledge ignorance about many of the inner workings of the administration. This is a secretive American government. In its eight months in office before Sept. 11, it took, out of public view, a series of decisions that made allies wonder if it cared about their concerns. One of those, shortly before Sept. 11, was to scuttle the long-negotiated enforcement protocol of the international convention on biological weapons -- ironically, now a dead letter as the world gets increasingly antsy about biological weapons.

The ABM Treaty decision particularly upset the French and Germans, who considered the pact the foundation of nuclear arms control. It was followed in January by Bush's announcement in his State of the Union speech that Iran, Iraq and North Korea constituted an "axis of evil." This infuriated Europeans trying to build bridges to Iran, and South Koreans and Japanese trying to work with North Korea. The administration stuck by the term, although it never explained how these three unconnected nations constituted an axis -- "an alliance of two or more countries to coordinate their foreign and military policies," according to one dictionary definition.

But the most important decision that fed our allies' anxiety about revived American unilateralism was last June's change of course on the Middle East. For many years the United States and its allies have differed on how best to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace; the United States has long been more sympathetic to Israeli governments than many Europeans have. But there was a qualitative change during the last year. The context for it was the war on terrorism.

President Bush has said from the outset that the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks hated America because "they hate our freedoms." But the available evidence does not support this explanation. Bin Laden's own statements and the personal histories of participants in the Sept. 11 plot suggest there are more specific reasons for the terrorists' hatred. They include American support for regimes that they detest in the Arab world; American bases on Arab territory, especially in Saudi Arabia; and American support for Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory and for Israel's military campaign against the Palestinians. Psychological alienation from modern Western culture and a radical interpretation of Islam add spice to this deadly stew.

By ignoring the items on this list and denouncing an enemy that hates us for what we are, not for what we say and do -- or what they think we do -- President Bush has created an all-purpose bad guy whose existence allows him to sidestep any examination of American policy. But al Qaeda is led by Arabs from the Middle East and is deeply rooted in Middle Eastern politics and intrigue. Its grievances, however irrational, come from there.

The administration acknowledged the Arab connection early on by recognizing a need for improved "public diplomacy" in the Middle East, to better explain U.S. policy to Arabs and improve America's image in the region. But the problem, as American specialists and Arabs pointed out, went beyond imagery and explanation. Arabs have real grievances against the United States, first of all connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This past spring, the intensification of violence from suicide bombings and Israeli retaliations created a Middle East crisis. Ariel Sharon and his colleagues used the crisis to press their view that the Palestinians killing Israelis were no different from the Egyptians and Saudis who flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, "is our bin Laden," Sharon said. Israel's objective, obviously, was to persuade America to make Arafat its enemy, too.

The Bush administration initially resisted, but by June, when Bush declared that Arafat had to be replaced, the United States had aligned its policy with Sharon's on virtually all operational questions. The administration continued to say it favored early creation of a Palestinian state and opposed Israeli settlements in occupied territory, but this rhetoric had no visible effect on Sharon, who has demonstrated no interest in a compromise with the Palestinians.

Judging by the public statements and published commentaries of Arab officials and analysts, they now see no significant difference between Bush and Sharon on the Palestinian issue. Bin Laden himself could have written this script, it so suits the goal of dividing the United States from the Arab world, including the Arab states that we have long considered our friends.

Potentially the most significant act of American unilateralism this year was President Bush's declaration -- at West Point, in June -- that the United States would reserve the right to act preemptively against groups or nations with terrorist intentions: "The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge .... The only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."

Thus began a summer of talk about preemptive war against Iraq. Israelis and Tony Blair of Britain showed some sympathy for the idea, but dozens of other international leaders expressed doubts. So, remarkably, did a long list of senior Americans who had served in earlier administrations, including George H.W. Bush's two secretaries of state, James A. Baker III and Lawrence Eagleburger, and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Their unusual public statements were evidence of profound disquiet in the upper reaches of the American establishment, where the idea of a unilateral, preemptive war caused deep alarm.

Last week the ground began to shift somewhat. Bush said he would make a speech on Iraq to the United Nations and would consult with the other permanent members of the Security Council. He promised to ask Congress to approve any military action, though his lawyers had argued earlier that such approval wasn't necessary. He also promised to build the case against Iraq in public, which politicians in both parties said he had to do. But all this had the flavor of after-the-fact cosmetics; Bush gave no hint he was prepared to change his mind about forcing "regime change" in Iraq.

What is the purpose of poking an American finger in the eye of just about every country in the world? What does the administration hope to gain by emphasizing unilateral options, from declaring war without Congress to telling other nations to sign up or get out of the way? Does such bullying ever pay off in politics, domestic or international?

In a democracy, voters want to participate. In a community of nations, governments want to participate. The issue isn't whether or not to fight terrorism -- a new poll of Europeans and American released last week showed strong support for military action against terrorists. But the same poll [see William Drozdiak's article today on Page B3] showed equally strong sentiment that any such action should be taken in concert with allies, and with the support of the United Nations.

The Americans questioned in this poll demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for this administration's foreign policies, a warning in an election year. Only 20 percent of Americans favored invading Iraq without the support of our allies and the U.N. On question after question, large majorities preferred acting with allies to acting alone. But public opinion hasn't yet been a factor, because the country hasn't had a debate about its global status. The United States became the only great power a dozen years ago, but we have never really confronted the implications of this fact. Our political class has largely taken a bye on the biggest questions of our time: How should the United States relate to other countries, and to international institutions? On what terms should we engage with the rest of the world? With what kind of armed forces? And what sort of diplomacy? Has preemptive war become acceptable?

The attacks of Sept. 11 announced a profound change in the world. They set us on a new course. But our politicians have let us down by failing to engage the country in a great discussion of the huge questions we face. On Wednesday, when we mark the anniversary of the horror of last Sept. 11, we still won't know where we are going, or why.

Robert Kaiser is an associate editor and senior correspondent of The Post.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49340-2002Sep7.html

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